#### NASA HAT Lab activities

- M:N
  - Working group
  - Sims
  - HDV
  - Issues
- Human as failsafe
  - Risk based interface with cognitive aiding
- PAAV
  - Auto-cargo m:N
- Hazard Perception and Avoidance
  - ACAS-Xr

# M:N Operations



## Working Group

- Broad collective of interested stakeholders from government, industry, and academia
- Identify and reduce barriers to m:N operations
  - Technical
  - Regulatory
  - safety assurance
  - community acceptance
  - Identified barriers are considered across a variety of multi-vehicle control contexts (e.g., Urban/Advanced Air Mobility, drone delivery, infrastructure inspection, disaster response and recovery, and high-altitude pseudo-satellite operations)
- Operational approval roadmap
- AUVSI April, 2022

#### HITLS

- Roles and Responsibilities
  - Complete (Uber)
- Hand-offs/Switching
  - Data analysis (Joby)
- Communication (Fall, 2022, Spring, 2023)
  - UAM (Joby, Wisk)
  - Small auto drone (Zipline)

### HDV Fleet Manager Plays

- Re-Route Tool
  - Pre-Flight
    - Develop initial flight plan
      - Constraints, goals (prioritized), HAT principles or consequences, info/display requirements
    - Modify flight plan in case of PSU rejection
  - Climb/Cruise (single & multi vehicle)
    - Develop amended flight plan in case of vehicle/airspace/vertiport anomaly
      - Must meet constraints of whatever off-nominal event forces amendment
    - Develop amended flight plan in case of non-conformance (either change e.g., speed of aircraft or change route)
  - Approach
    - Develop amended flight plan in case of vertiport resource change
- Handoff Plays (single & multi vehicle)
  - Real-time workload metrics of operators informs FM of necessary/potential need for handoff relief; also recommends who can accept handoff
- Fleet-wide Plays
  - One event causing change with multiple vehicles vs multiple events causing changes with multiple vehicles
  - Changes at vertiport
  - All land for some airspace emergency/security breach
  - Loss of PSU

#### Issues for m:N Use-Case

- Comm datalink, auto-fill pilot aids, PSU's
- Auto DAA how might this work, collison avoidance or DAA as well...
- Displays- display of multiple alerts/prioritization
- Pilot aids in such high workload situations, what aids would help
- SA displays how can we identify, prioritize and display the required info at the required time.
- Lost link how can we maintain predictability for ATC but still have DAA

## Technical Barriers

Туре	Barriers	
sUAS	<ol> <li>How do you keep Staff trained on technical systems where taking over is infrequent?</li> <li>Identify what info operator needs</li> <li>Ensure calibrated operator trust</li> <li>Scaling from lower number of vehicles to higher numbers</li> <li>How do you certify autonomous systems?</li> </ol>	
Large UAS	<ol> <li>SA for pilot</li> <li>Managing multiple voice channels (w/latency)</li> <li>Contingency management capabilities</li> <li>How to demonstrate pilot's ability to work in m:N framework?</li> <li>Battery management</li> <li>On demand operators to handle exceptions</li> <li>Crew to vehicle ratio</li> <li>Comms</li> <li>DAA systems (vision, sensor fusion)</li> </ol>	
UAM		
HAPS	Identify appropriate time horizons relevant to m:N interactions Identifying how SA needs to change in nominal vs contingency situations? What to display? When? To whom to display?	
Swarms	<ol> <li>SA of swarm state due to emergent behavior</li> <li>Supervisory control</li> <li>Impact of environmental and geo. Restrictions</li> <li>Hardware failures</li> </ol>	

# Operational Barriers

Туре	Barriers		
sUAS	<ol> <li>What level of automation is needed?</li> <li>How much workload can a single operator handle? How do you staff for spikes in workload?</li> </ol>		
Large UAS	In-flight changes Pilot response time New/increased human error under new paradigm Identify correct level of pilot involvement Handoff conops Enough funding for infrastructure Integration of ATM/UTM/etc. Corridors Standard/Accepted method for demonstrating that an organization's HAPS operations are "safe" and don't degrade safety of NAS Justification of how many vehicles an operator can control Define operating environment and procedures Operator roles: across boundaries, when swarm splits/mergers when failures occur How many operators is enough?		
UAM			
HAPS			
Swarms			

# Regulatory Barriers

Туре	Barriers		
sUAS	1. How do you show that your operations are safe enough and do not degrade the safety of the national airspace?		
Large UAS	<ul> <li>Identify pilot role</li> <li>Certification with less human involvement</li> <li>What data is needed to support regulatory changes?</li> <li>Liability</li> <li>Certification</li> <li>Noise</li> <li>Certification of highly automated systems</li> <li>Identifying what policies need to change</li> <li>Certification for non-deterministic behavior</li> <li>Defining airspace restrictions</li> </ul>		
UAM			
HAPS			
Swarms			

## Public Acceptance Barriers

Туре	Barriers		
sUAS	<ol> <li>Is the general public willing to accept sUAS flying over home etc.?</li> <li>Public acceptance of automation and trust (could be a generational issue)</li> </ol>		
Large UAS	-		
UAM	<ol> <li>Generational differences</li> <li>Credibility</li> <li>Noise</li> <li>Emissions</li> </ol>		
HAPS	<ol> <li>How to weigh perceived societal value against third-party risk</li> <li>Lack of ability to understand and quantify risk associated with upscaling HAPS operations</li> </ol>		
Swarms	<ol> <li>Explanability</li> <li>Reduce fear factor, immediate fear factor</li> </ol>		

### Common Barriers

Туре	Barriers	Timeline (near/mid/long term)
Technical	<ol> <li>Determining and maintaining adequate/appropriate SA, depends on many things: vehicle class, risk posture, LOA, scale, operator role</li> <li>Is the level identified by the breakdown of roles and responsibilities?</li> </ol>	
Operational	<ol> <li>Centralized (or decentralized) management system for task/work/airspace allocation</li> <li>If you have an operator who is managing multiple assets         <ol> <li>How many can they manage?</li> <li>Is it shared? If shared, how to split the responsibilities?</li> </ol> </li> <li>Should there be a distinction in operational barriers between RPAS and fully autonomous (e.g., Loon-like) operations?</li> </ol>	
Regulatory	1. Certification: automation, non-determinist system, airframe	
Public Acceptance	Transparency, explanability, trust	1

### SWS – Human as a Failsafe

How to address designs that rely on the human to jump in and save the day when automation fails?

### Failsafe

Develop risk-based interface

• Use advanced diagnostics to identify trends prior to alert stage

 Provide this SA and high probability mitigations to humans through cognitive aiding (HAT assistant)

## Ways to work together

- Join working group
  - Communicate

Coordinate research issues

- Over-guide request to TTT or AAM
  - Collaborate